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Barakat: Fixing What’s Broken with the SCA

FIXING WHAT’S BROKEN: THE OUTDATED GUIDELINES OF THE
SCA AND ITS APPLICATION TO MODERN INFORMATION
PLATFORMS
Lutfi Barakat*
ABSTRACT
In 1986, Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA) to afford privacy protections to electronic
communications and it has not changed since its inception. The
ECPA has proven problematic as technology has advanced, but
Congress has not modified the law to reflect this change. Courts
have struggled to apply the law to both old technologies that have
been updated and new technologies that have emerged. The ECPA
needs to be revised to reflect the new advances in technology or be
repealed and replaced with a new approach. This will ensure that
consumer data will be safeguarded while in the hands of data
provider companies.

*

J.D. Candidate 2021, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Touro Law Center. My interest in the
subject of data protection stems from how extensive technology was a part of my
upbringing. The amount of information and entertainment at my disposal not only
kept me informed and distracted, but also made me want to ask questions. Is this
website safe? Should I be uploading my sensitive information to this website?
What is keeping my information safe? The rise of technology also brought with it
the rise of hacking, something all of us have had to deal with at some point. The
underlying goal of this note was to understand how the law has attempted to
manage the internet and protect its users from the exploitation of others. The
ultimate objective of this note is to propose changes to the current legal structure of
data protection statutes to ensure stronger safeguards for our data and technologies.
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INTRODUCTION

In the current technology-dependent age, the lack of
safeguards against unreasonable invasions of consumer data from
third parties poses troubling implications for consumers.1 Back in
1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) to afford privacy protections to electronic communications. 2
Title 1 of the ECPA amended the federal Wiretap Act to address the
interception of electronic communications, while Title II created the
Stored Communications Act (SCA) to handle access to stored wire
and electronic communications and also transactional records. 3
Congress created the ECPA because it noted the “gap in protection
and the potentially devastating effects it had on privacy.” 4 However,
times have changed and the technology available has changed also.
Companies today maintain physical hard drives or servers of data
with inadequate supervision, leaving them susceptible to breaches. 5
The companies escape blame by not actively taking part in divulging
the information.6 This information can come in the form of incoming
and outgoing emails.7 Companies can share such generally stored
data with the government if it is for a legal purpose.8 This applies
even if the government entity obtained the information beyond the
scope of its reach and the customer did not receive notice. 9 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set a standard, known as the
“knowingly divulged” standard first seen in Theofel v. Farey-Jones,
that states if a defendant obtains consent through exploitation of a
known mistake, such as going beyond the scope of a subpoena, he
cannot seek refuge in that consent if it relates to the essential nature
of his access.10 The standard set by the Ninth Circuit, however, does

1

Simon M. Baker, Unfriending The Stored Communications Act: How The
Technological Advancement And Legislation Inaction Have Rendered Its
Protections Obsolete, 22 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 75, 78 (2011).
2
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002).
3
Id.
4
Baker supra note 1, at 80.
5
Id.
6
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
7
Id. at 1072.
8
Id. at 1071.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 1073.
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not take into account a company passively allowing the information
of its customers to be undefended against intrusions resulting from
mistakes such as overextending one’s reach. 11 These passive
breaches of consumer data protection occur because the SCA is
outdated in light of today’s modern technology that has far surpassed
the current protections that were created in the 1980s. 12 The
application of the SCA eventually made it into areas of private life,
like social media, and produced confusing results. 13
Despite the SCA’s flaws, the Ninth Circuit will continue to
use it until Congress acts. The Ninth Circuit has struggled to
determine the law involving facets of social media such as “likes”
and smartphones that gather geographic data, and has failed to
address the inability for some providers to fit within the remotecomputing services (RCS) and electronic communications services
(ECS) categories of the SCA.14 Companies that have allowed
consumer data to be shared and taken by the government on the
request of third parties should be held to a stricter standard as
regulated in an amended version of the SCA or a completely new
approach.
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones,15 NetGate, an internet service
provider (“ISP”), was forced to disclose emails on the order of a
subpoena.16 Farey-Jones’ attorney was only supposed to request in
the subpoena the relevant e-mails or e-mails from a certain period. 17
However, the subpoena was too broad in scope and time. 18 After
discovering that the subpoena was invalid, rendering the disclosure of
the emails improper,19 the plaintiff brought a claim arguing that
NetGate’s consent to the subpoena was invalid. 20 The scope of the
disclosure went to the heart of the subpoena, and as such, NetGate
11

Id.
Rudolph J. Burshnic, Applying The Stored Communications Act To The Civil
Discovery Of Social Networking Sites, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1259, 1264 (2012).
13
Id. at 1292-93.
14
Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp. 6 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (W.D. Wash. 2014); Rainsy v.
Facebook, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Quon v. Arch
Wireless Operating Co., Inc. 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
15
Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1072.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1071.
18
Id. at 1072.
19
Id.
20
Id.
12
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did not have the authority to relinquish control of its client’s emails. 21
The Ninth Circuit coined the “knowingly divulged” standard, stating
that if a mistake went to the essential nature of the invasion of
privacy, it would invalidate such invasion. 22 This offense, however,
is an exception, as the SCA, enacted in the 1980s, was not equipped
to handle the problems caused by emails and social media, such as
the scope and limitations of disclosing emails and the rise of social
media and its features.23 The ECS and RCS categories within the
statute have not withstood the test of time, and new technologies such
as social media are seemingly incompatible with it. 24 This Note will
discuss the reasons the SCA should be amended, if not repealed as a
whole.
Section II will explain the SCA’s various provisions relating
to the disclosure of data to third parties. Section III will examine
both the Ninth Circuit’s approach and the evolution of its standards
during the past two decades. Section IV will focus, specifically, on
the case of Theofel v. Farey-Jones and its articulation of the
“knowingly divulged” standard. Section V will argue in favor of
amending or repealing the SCA and discuss alternatives to better
accommodate emerging technologies. Finally, Section VI will
conclude that the SCA’s flaws outweigh its usefulness, and it should
be either amended or repealed.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF THE SCA AND OTHER DATA PRIVACY
LEGISLATION

In 1986, Congress passed the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA)25 to afford privacy protections to wired and
stored communications.26 Title I of the ECPA amended the federal
Wiretap Act27which existed prior to the ECPA, and handled
electronic communications, which consists of the information users
share via websites. 28 The main objective of Title I is to protect the
21

Id.
Id. at 1073.
23
Burshnic, supra note 12, at 1264.
24
Id.
25
Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002).
26
Id.
27
18 U.S.C. § 2510
28
Id.
22
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privacy of persons in connection with the use of electronic and wire
communications.29
Title II of the ECPA, also known as the SCA, is used by
aggrieved parties seeking relief for breaches of their electronic
information.30 While the SCA was enacted in 1986 to address the
lack of guidelines in the Fourth Amendment in the area of computer
technologies, it failed to account for the internet and the possible
ramifications the SCA could have on individual privacy.31 The court
in Low v. LinkedIn Corp.32 explained that the SCA was enacted to
assign criminal and civil liability “for certain unauthorized access to
stored communications and records.” 33 However, the SCA has a
limited scope and does not address all online transgressions.34
Specifically, the SCA prohibits entities that store information from
“knowingly divulg[ing]” that information to other outside entities. 35
However, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that reckless and negligent
conduct in maintaining user information only meets the “knowingly
divulged standard” when the provider sends the information to a
person or entity that is not the intended recipient. 36 This does not
take into account the provider sending a certain amount of
information that goes beyond the scope or limits of the disclosure.
Despite the static nature of the SCA, Congress has not changed the
statute and now the law is outdated and difficult to use.37
A.

The SCA’s Two Entities: RCS and ECS

The SCA focuses on two types of entities: RCS and ECS.38
The SCA defines an RCS as a service that provides computer storage
or processing services to the public through an electronic
communications service. 39 In other words, RCS refers to an
electronic communication service that stores and processes data of
29

Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
31
Id.
32
900 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Worix v. MedAssets, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 699, 702 (E.D. Ill. 2012).
37
Baker, supra note 1, at 78.
38
Id. at 85
39
Id. at 86.
30

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2021

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 37, No. 3 [2021], Art. 11

1450

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

consumers that subscribe to the service. 40 Next, the SCA defines an
ECS as an entity that provides its users with the ability to send or
receive wire or electronic communications. 41 For example, a
provider that supplies email services would be considered an ECS.42
An ECS, therefore, handles the actual transmission of that
information, whether the information is being received or being
transferred to another party.
Significantly, whether an entity is an RCS, ECS, or neither
plays a critical role in asserting an entity’s non-disclosure
obligations.43 If the entity is not in the RCS or ECS category, the
entity can reveal or use the contents however it wishes.44 Whether an
entity is an ECS or RCS depends upon what information is
disclosed.45 It is common practice today for businesses to store their
data with external providers. 46 Although most ISPs function as both,
the distinction is important because different services offer different
protections.47
B.

SCA Punishment and Exceptions

The SCA specifies the punishment for violating the statute.48
The statute provides punishment for offenses committed while
attempting to gain “commercial advantage, malicious destruction or
damage, or private commercial gain, or in furtherance of any criminal
or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States or any State.”49 If the offenders are found guilty under §
2701(b) of the SCA, they can receive a fine and up to ten years in
prison, but if the offense cannot be categorized under § 2701(b), then
the maximum sentence they can receive is a fine and five years.50
Finally, the SCA provides exceptions to accessing content if the

40

Id.
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 87.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(b).
49
Id.
50
Id.
41
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conduct was authorized. 51 Specifically, if access was authorized “by
the person or entity providing a wire or electronic communications
service,” or, “by a user of that service with respect to a
communication of or intended for that user,” then no penalty would
be applicable.52
In addition, Congress enacted the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act (“CFAA”) in 1986 to address the problem of computer hacking. 53
It provides criminal penalties to those who accessed a computer
without authorization to commit fraud. 54 The aggrieved party must
show that the computer accessed was protected, the party attempting
to gain access was not authorized to use the computer, that the party
had the intent to commit the crime and the party defrauded the owner
of something of value.55
III.

CASES WHERE INADEQUATE SECURITY PRACTICES CAUSED
INJURY

The courts in several cases determined that the companies that
held the aggrieved parties’ information had caused them injury
through their inadequate security practices. 56 In Low, the court
determined that the plaintiffs had brought an actionable cause for
relief.57 In that case, the plaintiffs suffered harm when LinkedIn
transmitted their LinkedIn data, including their browsing history and
identification to third parties as well as advertisers, marketing
companies and data brokers.58 This allowed third parties to recreate
the plaintiffs’ user identity and gather sensitive information about the
plaintiff from their browsing history.59 The court found that the
plaintiffs’ alleged violation of surveillance statutes gave it a
51

Id. § 2701(c).
Id.
53
Id. at 1060.
54
U.S. v. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1057-58 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
55
Id.
56
See McDonald v. Kiloo ApS, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1033 (N.D. Cali. 2019);
Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Freedman v.
America Online, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 638, 643 (E.D. Va. 2004); In re Pharmatrak,
Inc., 329 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2003); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274
F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001).
57
Low, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
58
Id. at 1017.
59
Id.
52
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“concrete” foundation that supported Article III standing.60 The court
disagreed that LinkedIn could be classified as an RCS or ECS
because it did not meet the SCA standards.61 The court found that
LinkedIn was not an RCS because it was not holding or processing
the offsite third party’s information, specifically their profile URLs
and their LinkedIn IDs.62 This information was generated by
LinkedIn itself and not sent by the users. 63 If LinkedIn could be
categorized as an RCS or ECS it would have been held liable, but the
court held that LinkedIn could not be categorized as an RCS.64
LinkedIn does not take the user IDs and URLs and store them with a
third party (in this case LinkedIn) and the same applies with the
user.65 Had LinkedIn functioned as an advanced computer program
that processed information, it would have been classified as an RCS,
but the court found otherwise. 66
In McDonald v. Kiloo ApS67 the district court decided that the
plaintiffs had alleged an actionable claim for violation of the SCA
against the companies holding and transmitting their data. 68 In that
case, the plaintiffs sued both the developers of the apps their children
used, Disney, Kiloo, and Viacom, as well as the SDK defendants. 69
The SDK defendants were a group of mobile advertising and
monetization companies that provided kits for collecting user data. 70
The plaintiffs’ complaints alleged that the SDK defendants were
coordinating together to collect recovered data from children for the
purpose of profiling and targeting children with specific
advertisements.71 To collect the data, Disney, Kiloo, and Viacom
were provided a specific code that would transmit consumer data to
the SDK for data tracking and ad targeting. 72 The extensive data
gathered on the child-users allowed SDK to create sophisticated
60

Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1023.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
385 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1028.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 1029.
72
Id.
61

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss3/11

8

Barakat: Fixing What’s Broken with the SCA

2021

FIXING WHAT’S BROKEN WITH THE SCA

1453

profiles of the children.73 SDK would then send their profiles to third
parties, allowing third parties to target them with advertising based
on those profiles.74 Disney relied on New York General Business
Law Section 349(a) to discredit the plaintiffs’ claims.75 To bring a
violation of consumer protection under New York law, the plaintiffs
had to show that the companies engaged in deceptive practices. 76
The court agreed that the breadth of the company’s data collection
efforts violated the New York statute and the plaintiffs were entitled
to relief.77
The court held that the plaintiffs had introduced sufficient
claims under the New York and California consumer protection
statutes, stating respectively that the companies had indeed collected
the information and utilized it under New York law, and that the
collection of the data was unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent under
California law.78
In Freedman v. American Online, Inc., 79 the district court
determined that the ISP, American Online (AOL), had a reasonable
basis to question the validity of a warrant it received. In this case, an
internet service subscriber sued two police officers and AOL for
violating his rights when the officers accessed his private information
retained by the provider in connection with an obscene email other
parties had received. 80 The court stated that AOL met the
“knowingly divulg[ing]” standard of the ECPA by transmitting the
information to the Police Department after requesting it. 81 As a
result, the court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff. 82 While
AOL claimed that it did not have the requisite state of mind specified
in the statute to knowingly divulge the information, since it relied on
a defective warrant before divulging the consumer information to the
police, the court rejected the defendant’s contention.83 The court
stated that AOL did not need a specific state of mind; rather, it only
73

Id.
Id. at 1029.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1038-39.
79
412 F. Supp. 2d 174 (E.D. Va. 2004).
80
Id. at 180.
81
Id. at 183.
82
Id. at 180.
83
Id. at 183.
74
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had to divulge the information to another party intentionally,
regardless of the reason.84
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Pharmatrak, Inc.85
determined that defendant Pharmatrak’s website intercepted the
messages within the meaning of the ECPA.86 The First Circuit
agreed with the plaintiffs that the users of Pharmatrak’s website,
NETcompare, did not consent to the tracking of their information. 87
Pharmatrak used the information to analyze where on the website its
users visited so Pharmatrak could compare the tracking information
to Pharmatrak’s competitors.88 Although Pharmatrak stated to its
clients that the cookies 89 it used to save data would not collect
personal information, the personal information of over two hundred
users was nonetheless found on Pharmatrak’s servers. 90 The defense
tried to argue that Pharmatrak did not meet the requirement of
“intercepting” the communications as indicated in the statute. 91 The
statute defined interception as the acquisition of any information
through the use of an electronic device. 92 The website narrowed
down the incoming communications to include interceptions that
were contemporaneous with the transmission. 93 The court decided
that it satisfied this stipulation; the GIF, 94 or the graphic interchange
format, that enabled the interception to “sometimes arrive[d] before
the content delivered by the pharmaceutical clients.” 95
This
interception happened either before or alongside the transmission. 96
The interception itself was done with NETcompare, an automatic
routing program.97 Automatic routing programs are the only
exception to the principle that interceptions of emails that are not
84

Id.
329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003)
86
Id.
87
Id. at 21.
88
Id. at 13.
89
What
is
a
cookie?,
ALL
ABOUT
COOKIES,
https://www.allaboutcookies.org/cookies/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2021).
90
In Re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 14.
91
Id. at 22.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Andrew Heinzman, What is a GIF, and how do you use them? (Sept. 25, 2019)
https://www.howtogeek.com/441185/what-is-a-gif-and-how-do-you-use-them/.
95
In Re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 22.
96
Id.
97
Id.
85
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already prohibited by the Wiretap Act are impossible. 98 Therefore,
the court decided that, despite its intentions, Pharmatrak had
intercepted its clients’ data and violated the ECPA.99
In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc. 100 the First
Circuit determined that the defendant, Explorica, had violated the
CFAA in taking pricing data. 101 Explorica was formed by exmembers of EF (“Education First”) Cultural Travel as well as other
institutions, and decided to compete in the teenage touring
industry.102 The defendant used a scraper program that collected
pricing information from EF and its users, allowing it to undercut
EF’s prices in the tour market. 103 Once this came to light during
litigation regarding an individual’s departure from EF, the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts found that
Explorica had exceeded authorized access into EF’s servers.104 The
First Circuit affirmed, holding that EF exceeded the reasonable limits
of its authorization when it began taking proprietary information. 105
In Suzlon Energy Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp.,106 the Ninth Circuit
determined that the ECPA was meant to offer protection to any
person, regardless of the status of his or her United States
citizenship.107 The defendant Suzlon sought emails in a server
maintained by Microsoft to use in a civil fraud proceeding against an
Indian citizen.108 Microsoft argued that the disclosure of these emails
would violate the ECPA, stating that the emails had to be
discoverable in a foreign proceeding and that the subpoenas had to
comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.109 The Ninth
Circuit found otherwise, saying that the ECPA provided disclosure to
any person, without any qualification. 110 A plain reading of the
statute indicates that it would naturally include foreign citizens as
98

Id.
Id.
100
274 F.3d 577, 579 (1st Cir. 2001).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 580.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 583-84.
106
671 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 2011).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 727.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 729.
99
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well.111 The court also stated that this protection applies not only to
acquisition by government entities, but also to civilian entities. 112
With this decision, the Ninth Circuit effectively extended the
protections of the ECPA to foreign citizens and would next target
social media corporations.
A.

SCA’s Impact on Social Media

Despite the challenges and uncertainties of applying the SCA
and ECPA to innovations such as social media, the court utilized
them in its decision in Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc. 113 in a case
involving Facebook.114 Before Crispin, the District Court for the
Central District of California in Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating
Co., Inc.115 decided that social media sites such as Facebook could
not be considered an ECS because the information was not privately
held but put on public display.116 However, this court changed views
upon reconsideration, holding that the ECS was meant to apply
broadly to any service that facilitated email communications.117 The
court also indicated that services such as Facebook provide private
messaging services.118 Facebook, therefore, can be classified as more
than an ECS but the judge relegated it to one category. By doing so,
the court attempted to apply a statute to an area that that it previously
recognized was not suited for new technologies like social media.119
Regardless, the court did not find evidence that the information was
available to the public as dispositive. 120 The fact that the information
stored on Facebook was held in backup as storage for both the benefit
of the user and the ISP allows social media to be categorized within
the ECPA.121

111

Id.
Id. at 730.
113
717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
114
Id.
115
529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
116
Crispin, 717 F. Supp. 2d. at 980.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 988.
120
Id. at 990.
121
Id.
112
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Cases Where SCA Did Not Apply

In the case of Casillas v. Cypress Insurance Co.122 the
plaintiffs were unable to obtain relief because the Ninth Circuit held
that the SCA did not apply. 123 The plaintiffs, Hector Casillas and
Adela Gonzales, stored their worker’s compensation information on
the defendant’s website, which was maintained by a third party called
HQSU.124 The plaintiffs’ information was accessed by the defendant,
the website creator, at the behest of insurance investigators. 125 The
plaintiffs sued in the District Court for the Central District of
California, but their complaint was dismissed for failure to state a
claim for which relief can be granted. 126 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s judgment denying them relief. 127 It held that the
website did not fit into the category of ECS, because the website’s
users could not communicate directly with one another. 128 Ninth
Circuit precedent held that websites that allowed users to
communicate with one another were permitted categorization as ECS
providers.129 In analyzing the website in the Casillas case, the court
stated that the plaintiffs had to download the documents they
requested from the server, rather than from another user acting as a
sender.130 In addition, the court recognized that the documents and
comments did not travel directly from the sender to the recipient.131
Therefore, the plaintiffs could not allege that a direct communication
occurred.132 As a result, the website did not receive classification as
an ECS and the plaintiffs were denied relief. 133
In Cousineau v. Microsoft Corp. 134 the United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington denied the plaintiff

122

770 Fed. App’x 329, 330 (9th Cir. 2015).
Id.
124
Casillas v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Companies, CV 15-04763 (JEMx),
2017 WL 2813145 at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2017).
125
Id.
126
770 Fed. App’x at 330.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.at 331.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
6 F. Supp. 3d 1167 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
123
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relief under the SCA 135 because smartphones were classified as
ECS.136 The plaintiff sued the manufacturer for collecting data
relating to the user’s geographic location through its smartphone. 137
The court analyzed the SCA, but came across a problem when it
reached the question of whether mobile phones are facilities. 138
Despite the SCA’s not defining a “facility,” the court began by
working with the SCA’s definition of an “electronic communication
service.”139 The court defined an ECS as any service which provides
users with the ability to send or receive wire or electronic
communications, and specifically stated that electronic
communications consisted of the sending of images, writings, signs
and other information.140 Smartphones were considered electronic
services under the Act, but the issue was whether they came within
the definition of a facility.141
The court held that smartphones did fit within the definition
of a facility, stating that the “device enabled the use of the location
services rather than providing them.” 142 The SCA was meant to
protect facilities operated by electronic communications service
providers and maintaining electronic storage, not computers that
enabled their use. 143 In the present case, the plaintiff’s smartphone
did not provide other users with geographical information, but
received the relevant information from Microsoft. 144 As a result,
plaintiff’s phone could not be categorized as a server.145 The fact that
the phone both received and sent data did not change that result
because almost all smartphones transmit data to service providers. 146
Finally, the court explained that if it accepted the argument that the
smartphone sent geographic information, then Microsoft was
providing third parties with access to the plaintiff’s phone. 147 Thus
135
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the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and
denied the plaintiff protection. 148
The outcomes of Casillas and Cousineau provide examples of
parties being denied relief because the facilities which processed the
parties’ data did not fit within the definitions in the SCA. In the case
of Casillas, the website in which the plaintiffs stored their data could
be categorized as an RCS, but not an ECS, so relief was denied under
the SCA.149 This prevented the plaintiffs from successfully arguing
that some services can be both RCS and ECS. 150 In previous Ninth
Circuit cases such as Quon,151 this distinction served to completely
deny or grant liability under the statute. 152 In Quon, the court granted
the plaintiffs’ demands for relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (a)(1)
because the service that provided the plaintiffs a platform on which to
post text messages could be classified as an ECS. 153 In contrast, the
court in Casillas found for the defendants even though the plaintiffs
proved the website could be classified as an RCS because the
plaintiffs created it pursuant to 2702(a)(1), which required the
website to be identifiable as an ECS. 154
IV.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND DATA PROTECTION

The Ninth Circuit, in examining claims brought under the
SCA, has attempted to reconcile the statutory text with the reality of
the modern internet.155 Before the SCA, Congress hoped to address
the inability of the Fourth Amendment to address invasions of
privacy by new technologies with the passage of a new act. 156 The
Fourth Amendment regulated a large, growing field and the rapid
development of technology revealed the weakness resulting from its
age.157 Thus, Congress enacted the Wiretap Act, but it was limited in
scope and was quickly outpaced by technological advances. 158
148
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Congress’s attempts to amend the act were not successful because the
rapid advancement of technology kept outpacing Congress’s
amendments.159 The ECPA was enacted in order to address the
Wiretap Act’s deficiencies by adding amendments, and one of the
ECPA’s most prominent provisions was the SCA.160 Thirty years
later, it is the only act that addresses information held in storage
despite the change in technology.161
The SCA has changed little since its enactment in the 1980s
and courts have struggled to apply its outdated definitions. 162 The
rapid rise of the internet reduced the SCA’s usefulness.163 The
SCA’s original purpose was to address a crucial turning point for the
Fourth Amendment as the internet was created. 164 Specifically, its
goal was to address the internet-based privacy violations that can be
brought under the Fourth Amendment, such as the unauthorized
access to e-mails by a government entity.165 However, its narrowly
tailored mandate meant it could not be used in cases that do not
involve violations of the Fourth Amendment. 166
Even when the SCA applies to an entity, it might not apply to
the information being sought. 167 For an ECS, providers are only
prohibited from disclosing information that is held in storage. 168 The
SCA defines storage as information held in a computer server
incidental to the electronic transmission as well as information that is
held in a server for the purpose of backup protection.169 In contrast,
an RCS is only prohibited from disclosing information being held in
storage or for computer processing by its customers.170 Neither of
these definitions provides for information that was intercepted. 171
The distinctions between the different services and the lack of clarity
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provide even more problems for those seeking to acquire information
that is otherwise disclosable. 172
A.

The Ninth’s Circuit Current Use of the SCA

The Ninth Circuit continues to use the SCA to solve internetrelated problems that have no precedent to anything seen in the
1980s.173 In Rainsy v. Facebook, Inc.,174 the District Court for the
Northern District of California attempted to address the scope of
protection afforded to a “like”175 when used on Facebook and
whether the plaintiff who made the “like” could disclose his or her
identity.176 The court stated that giving a “like” on Facebook equates
to showing approval of the post, constituting it as “contents of a
communication.”177 Under the SCA, “contents of a communication”
concern the substance and meaning of the message.178 Since
revealing the identity concerns the substance of the message, and
since the message, the “like,” was one of approval, disclosure of the
identity of the people who liked the post is precluded.179
Another example of the Ninth Circuit using the SCA is
presented in the case of hiQ Labs v. LinkedIn Corporation.180 On
appeal, the court determined whether an injunction for hiQ Labs, an
analytics company, against LinkedIn for invoking the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) was appropriate. 181 In hiQ Labs,
LinkedIn decided to help employers find the employees they desire
by presenting to them the data collected from LinkedIn’s servers. 182
The data collected by LinkedIn was present in its servers as a result

172
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of its nearly 500 million users.183 Previously, hiQ Labs was “data
scraping” LinkedIn’s servers. 184 Data scraping is the process of using
automated bots and algorithms to mine other company’s websites for
data, which here was LinkedIn, categorize that data and sell it to
business clients.185 Once LinkedIn became aware of hiQ Labs’
activities, it sent a cease and desist letter alleging that by data
scraping its website, hiQ Labs violated the CFAA.186
The lower court granted hiQ Labs’ preliminary injunction and
LinkedIn appealed. 187 Although the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on
the CFAA, it mentioned the SCA. Specifically, it stated that the
similarities between the SCA and the CFAA made it clear that the
court should interpret the two statutes pari passu, or on an equal
footing.188 The court noted the similar language, particularly in a
provision from both statutes that stated if anyone were to access
information from an electronic communications service without
authorization, the accessor would be punished.189
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Konop remains the standard
for cases concerning websites where electronic information is on a
“wall,” even though that case dealt with electronic bulletin boards
years before social media. 190 The Ninth Circuit denied relief under
the SCA, holding that Hawaiian Airlines’ use of the website was not
at the standard required by the SCA. 191 Since social media platforms
like Facebook share similar purposes, they too should be governed by
this standard.192 Comparing Facebook’s format to the online bulletin
in Konop is similar to the issue with the SCA as a whole; it does not
serve its purpose anymore. In Konop, the messages sent to the
bulletin board had to be opened to be accessed, while Facebook posts
are readily visible to authorized users.193 As a result, there is no step
where a Facebook post is held in storage as were the posts in Konop.
This lack of compatibility illustrates the foundational issues that the
183
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Konop test faces when applied to social media cases, and why the
Ninth Circuit needs to reconsider its approach. That method can only
come about once Congress amends the SCA to address the outdated
ECS and RCS categories or repeals it outright and enacts a new
statute. Once done so, this solution will provide a way to properly
judge social media sites from older mediums that share data such as
the electronic bulletin board in Konop.
The court relied heavily on the similarities between the CFAA
and the SCA in its determination as to whether hiQ Labs was
precluded from alleging its claim regarding hiQ Labs’ gathering of
data.194 The Ninth Circuit discussed its previous decisions in Konop
to provide guidance on distinguishing between public and non-public
websites.195 Konop and hiQ both dealt with websites that contain
private information provided by their users that are protected by a
username and password combination. 196 In hiQ, the court recognized
that websites that advertise themselves as confidential deserved
protection, while those that are accessible to the public would not be
able to impose liability on somebody else for accessing it. 197 Since
the information that LinkedIn was seeking to protect was not
considered confidential or out of the reach of those hoping to access
the data, the court could not hold hiQ Labs liable for accessing it. 198
If an effective statute had been in place, hiQ Labs would be liable for
not providing a secure website.
The next case provides an example of the use of the SCA to
analyze a complicated matter when an updated statute would have
performed better. In the case of In re Zynga Privacy Litigation,199 the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs could not
allege a violation of the SCA against Facebook, the developer Zynga
or third parties for receiving the Facebook IDs and URLs contained
in the plaintiffs’ headers. 200 The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by
determining if the HTTP referrer information was applicable to the
SCA’s provisions.201 The court searched through precedent as far
194
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back as the 1980s to define the meaning of the word “contents.” 202
The court found that the statute defines contents as any information
that concerns the “substance,” “purport,” or “meaning” of the
communication.203 The court turned to the dictionary definitions of
those words in order to understand Congress’s intent. 204 In short,
after the court’s consideration of those dictionary terms, it defined
contents as “a person’s intended message to another.” 205 Although
the information in the header could identify the users, the court
interpreted the statute as expressly allowing this: it only prevents
disclosure of content from a communication, not personally
identifiable information.206
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the record
information can become content if it is the subject of a
communication, but the court did not find this convincing. 207 Using
Pharmatrak as an analogy, the court stated that the header disclosed
information about the user’s communication, not the communication
itself.208 The plaintiffs also argued that the URLs could provide
contents of a communication rather than record information and
violate their privacy under the Fourth Amendment, but again, the
court disagreed with their claims. 209 Using the Fourth Amendment,
the court held that the recorded information, as it stated in past cases,
leaves no reasonable expectation of privacy, but content
communication does.210 The court found it determinative that since
the URL information includes only basic identification and address
information, not search terms, it could not constitute the content of a
communication.211
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THE IMPORTANCE OF THEOFEL V. FAREY-JONES

Plaintiffs, officers of ICA, or Integrated Capital Associates
Inc., sued the defendant Farey-Jones.212 During discovery, the
defendant took action to acquire the e-mails from ICA about the case
and proceeded to subpoena NetGate, the ISP in charge of holding
ICA’s emails.213 NetGate, without consulting with ICA first and at
the defendant’s insistence, relinquished to Farey-Jones over three
hundred emails, some containing personal and sensitive
information.214 In response, the plaintiffs brought this action against
Farey-Jones and the attorney, alleging violations of the SCA and the
CFAA.215 The United States District Court for the Northern District
of California decided that none of the statutes applied and dismissed
the claims, and in response, the plaintiffs appealed. 216 The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit previously dealt with this issue in the
case of Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., and noted that other circuit
courts have dealt with the issue differently. 217 The First Circuit held
in a case that access might be unauthorized under the CFAA if it is
not in line with the reasonable expectations of the party granting
permission.218 The Second Circuit also held that, in one case, access
is unauthorized where that access is not related to the system’s
intended function.219 In Theofel, the court compared the taking of
electronic information to trespass: “[J]ust as trespass protects
[people] who rent space in a commercial facility to hold sensitive
documents, the [Stored Communications] Act protects users whose
electronic communications are in electronic storage with an ISP . . .
.”220
In taking this approach, the court acknowledged that the
defendant would not be held liable if the entry was authorized. 221
However, consent given can be invalidated if it was given through
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deceit.222 Consent is invalid if the deceit is so egregious that it goes
to the essential nature of the act. 223 The distinction between
something minor and something major is best defined by the specific
interests that an action for trespass was meant to protect. 224 As the
court summarized, “[p]ermission to access a stored communication
does not constitute valid authorization if it would not defeat a
trespass claim in analogous circumstances.” 225 As a result, NetGate’s
consent to the subpoena order was invalidated by the improper nature
of this order.226 It violated the federal rules and allowed information
that would have otherwise remained private to be exposed to another
party that took few measures to prepare a proper order.227
VI.

ARGUMENT: WHY THE SCA NEEDS TO BE AMENDED OR
REPEALED

The most effective way to protect consumers from the
growing threats to their data from third parties is to revise and amend
the SCA and the accompanying statutes.228 According to one
prominent computer law professor, Orin Kerr, the SCA “is dense and
confusing, and few cases exist to explain how the statute works.”229
Its classifications proved to be its most fatal flaw; in creating two
types of providers, the ECS and the RCS, the SCA failed to provide
guidance in cases where the providers did not fit in to these
categories or could meet both.230 The SCA was also limited in scope
as it was not “a catch-all statute designed to protect the privacy of
stored internet communications.”231 Instead, it was narrowly created
to address Fourth Amendment violations.232 As a result, judges have
modified the statute to address areas of the internet the SCA was not
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designed to govern.233 Although the drafters of the statute based the
SCA on the internet usages of the time, they did not have the
foresight to implement measures in the statute to compensate for the
internet’s rapid evolution.234 With certain measures in place, the
SCA can be an efficient legislative tool in governing information
cases regarding both updated and new technologies.
The SCA only provides minimal protection against the
disclosure of emails and other sensitive information to third parties,
especially the government. 235 Some stored information can be
accessed with very minimal effort while the other party is only
required to provide notice and serve a subpoena. 236 In effect, the
government can “often compel all opened e-mails from an ISP with a
mere subpoena and without meaningful notice—precisely the result
the SCA was enacted to avoid.” 237 Congress’s reasoning behind the
lower threshold in 1986 was to safeguard the right of privacy
protected under the Fourth Amendment. 238 However, this was meant
to accommodate the Supreme Court’s understanding of the internet at
the time.239 For example, it adhered to notions that if storage is not
accessed for over 180 days, then it is considered abandoned. 240 By
anchoring the SCA on the Supreme Court’s understanding of the
internet back in the 1980s, Congress failed to take into account the
shifting importance of the internet in modern times.241 This also
poses the concern about Congress’s lack of foresight and the courts’
as well; neither did Congress anticipate that technology would
develop or anticipate that the SCA’s categories would be blurred.
Specifically, Congress should have known that ECS and RCS
definitions would overlap given that some entities fulfill both roles.
Congress also should have anticipated that there would be confusion
regarding specific phrases like “intentionally divulge.” However,
Congress allowed the statute to exist without any significant reform.
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The court in Crispin focused its inquiry on the wall posts of
sites like Facebook and Myspace by utilizing its distinctions in
Konop.242 In Konop, the court could not categorize the website used
in that case as intermediate storage, but thought that it could be
categorized as back-up storage.243 The issue that complicated matters
in Konop was that it dealt with a BBS, or a bulletin board service.244
It could not be categorized under the definition of an ECS because
when the post reached the board, it was not in an intermediate stage
and pending delivery to another source. 245 However, the court
reasoned that since the provider did not delete the post on the wall
after it had been sent and read, it constituted storage that could be
allocated as back-up storage.246 Also, because the BBS fulfilled the
same purpose as Facebook or Myspace, it could not be differentiated
and must presumably be held for back-up purposes.247 In the end,
this reasoning only suggests that “the court was determined to apply
the SCA whenever possible and that it was in favor of granting the
protection the SCA offers.” 248 The SCA could then, as a result, be
used whenever somebody posts something onto social media. 249
Although it is tempting to consider the bulletin board of Konop as an
analogy to social media wall posts, the court’s decision is more in
line with its agenda to keep following the rigid guidelines of the
SCA, interpreting the text to apply for today when it was better suited
for the situations of the past.
Finally, in Cousineau, the court admitted that it cannot define
what the SCA regards as a “facility.” 250 Instead, the court relied on
precedent relating to computers and smartphones along with the
SCA’s definition of “electronic communications service.” 251 In
applying the SCA, the court concluded that since mobile phones
could not act similarly to SCA facilities by providing location
services in a “server-like” fashion, mobile phones could not
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constitute an ECS.252 Even when evidence was presented that the
mobile device both received and sent out information, the court
dismissed the claim, saying that nearly all mobile devices transmit
data to service providers. 253 The definitions and standards the Ninth
Circuit relied on in using the SCA illustrate the risks and dangers
facing potential aggrieved parties as they attempt to seek relief.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs in Theofel were already involved in litigation
when their adversaries, hoping to gain an edge, made aggressive
requests in pursuit of discovery that endangered the plaintiffs’
privacy.254 The plaintiffs were able to recover for the damages their
adversaries cost them because the court held, based on its
interpretation of the SCA, that the defendant’s knowledge of the
invalidity of the subpoena evidenced knowledge of bad faith and
negligence.255
However, many parties that have had their
confidential information accessed under false guises of authorization
were not as lucky. To better safeguard the private information of the
people, the SCA and the ECPA need to be amended to better conform
to the people’s expectations for digital security.
The SCA is based on technology from the 1980s and this
creates confusion if it is amended. Instead, it should be restructured
to account for modern technology. As previously noted, the SCA and
ECPA were both created at a time soon after the advent of the
internet and have not been updated since. 256 The statutory language
does not provide suitable guidelines.
Specifically, trying to
categorize certain services that provide electronic or wired services
between RCS or ECS has created confusion and uncertainty. These
categories do not consider entities that can be classified as RCS or
ECS. Further complicating matters is that the courts continue to
utilize the SCA and work within its archaic categories since Congress
has yet to update the statute to address new technologies.257
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An alternative to outright repeal of the SCA would be to
amend it to better accommodate internet advances. The Ninth Circuit
along with other circuits has grown familiar with the SCA over the
past three decades. 258 Without action from Congress, the Ninth
Circuit has had little choice but to continue using the Act in response
to the growing number of cases that involve information online and
through platforms like social media. However, courts have struggled
to apply the SCA. The various ways that information is being shared
between users and companies use their users’ information to benefit
their subscribers as well as themselves are scenarios to which the
SCA will likely never adapt. If the statute were to be repealed, courts
would have to spend years learning new definitions that would surely
be more complicated than the SCA is today. There is also the chance
that case law might be overturned should new amendments to the
SCA be introduced. However, amending the SCA would allow the
law to conform to modern standards without creating the shock that
would come with repealing the statute outright. The creators of the
SCA had good intentions, but the SCA of the future or a similar
equivalent should be enacted or amended to consider the everchanging use of technology.
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